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Abstract
We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inﬂation
forecast contracts, which make central bankers’ remunerations contingent on the
precision of their inﬂation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central
bankers to inﬂuence inﬂation expectations more eﬀectively, thus facilitating more
successful stabilization of current inﬂation. Inﬂation forecast contracts improve
the accuracy of inﬂation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output.
On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance
improves welfare.
Keywords: central banks, incentive contracts, transparency, inﬂation targeting,
inﬂation forecast targeting, intermediate targets
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this paper.1 Introduction
There is general consensus that central banks should publish forecasts about economic
variables, and inﬂation in particular, but that these forecasts should not be viewed
as commitments.1 In this paper we argue that the ﬁrst part of this consensus is
justiﬁed but that the second part is not. In particular, we propose making central
bankers accountable for the accuracy of their inﬂation forecasts by introducing incentive
contracts that reward central bankers for forecasting precision. We call these contracts
inﬂation forecast contracts.
To assess our proposal, we make use of the standard New Keynesian framework (see
Clarida et al. (1999) or Woodford (2003a)). In each period, the central banker issues
an inﬂation forecast for the next period. In the absence of inﬂation forecast contracts,
the central banker’s loss function equals the social loss function. If inﬂation forecast
contracts are introduced, the central banker will also take into account the rewards he
receives for precise forecasts.
We show that paying central bankers for the accuracy of their forecasts enhances
welfare. Intuitively, inﬂation forecast contracts would lend credibility to the central
bankers’ inﬂation forecasts by making it costly for central bankers to deviate from
their forecasts. As a result, central bankers can use inﬂation forecasts to inﬂuence the
public’s inﬂation expectations. This facilitates better stabilization of cost-push shocks
because, in the New Keynesian Phillips curve, inﬂation also depends on expectations
about future inﬂation.
Imagine, for example, a situation where a cost-push shock would drive up inﬂation.
The conventional reaction by central banks would be to increase interest rates, thereby
lowering output and hence also inﬂation. If central bankers are rewarded for the pre-
cision of their forecasts, they can use an additional channel to stabilize inﬂation by
promising to ensure a low inﬂation rate in the future. The public knows that the
1Currently, all major central banks release forecasts about key economic variables. For an overview
of how transparent central banks are, see Eijﬃnger and Geraats (2006). Svensson (2009), among
others, stresses that interest-rate forecasts should not be viewed as commitments.
2central banker has a ﬁnancial interest in fulﬁlling his promise, so the central banker
can use inﬂation forecasts to steer the public’s inﬂation expectations and thus, in turn,
inﬂation.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the large literature on inﬂation targeting. An early exposition
of the experiences made by central banks adopting this monetary policy strategy can
be found in Bernanke et al. (1999). The main advantages of inﬂation targeting are
associated with anchoring inﬂation expectations and the furtherance of credibility and
transparency.2
More particularly, our paper is related to Svensson (1997a), who introduced the notion
of inﬂation forecast targeting. He shows that, in the presence of lags in monetary
transmission, monetary policy is bound to be welfare-maximizing if the central bank’s
optimal forecast corresponds to the inﬂation target. He argues that it is accordingly
advantageous to use the inﬂation forecast as an intermediate target because it has the
advantage of being easier to monitor by the public than inﬂation itself. Our paper
diﬀers from Svensson (1997a) in two ways. First, in our model the central banker sets
his forecasts strategically to inﬂuence the public’s inﬂation expectations. Second, we
consider the optimal design of contracts that make central bankers accountable for the
accuracy of their forecasts.
Because the incentive contracts studied in this paper aﬀect the central banker’s objec-
tive function, our contribution is also related to Woodford and Svensson (2005), who
explore how the central bank’s loss function should be modiﬁed in order to minimize
social losses from a timeless perspective. However, this procedure requires that the
central bank change its own future loss function in each period. Moreover, it may re-
sult in alternative, inferior equilibria. In our approach, the central bank’s loss function
is constant across periods, and the equilibrium is unique.
2Articles assessing the advantages of inﬂation targeting include Laubach (2003), Leiderman and
Svensson (1995), McCallum (1999), Mishkin (1999), Svensson (1997a, 1999).
3Gersbach and Hahn (2011) is complementary to the present paper. In a note, they
exclusively address the question whether central banks should release interest-rate
forecasts for the exogenously given psychological costs of deviating from forecasts pre-
viously made. In the present paper, we focus on inﬂation forecasts and endogenize the
costs of deviating from forecasts through inﬂation forecast contracts.
The use of incentive contracts for central bankers was ﬁrst proposed in the highly inﬂu-
ential paper by Walsh (1995).3 In a neoclassical model with a classic time-inconsistency
problem, Walsh (1995) identiﬁes incentive contracts that lead both to an elimination of
the inﬂation bias and to eﬃcient shock stabilization. We consider incentive contracts
that are contingent on the central banker’s forecasting performance and explore their
consequences in a New Keynesian model.
Finally, inﬂation forecast contracts are related to Woodford (2003b). He shows that,
even when interest-rate smoothing is not socially desirable per se, it is socially ad-
vantageous to assign an interest-smoothing objective to central banks. In our paper
it is beneﬁcial to make the central banker responsible for minimizing the deviations
between his inﬂation forecasts and actual inﬂation, although highly accurate inﬂation
forecasts have no direct implications for welfare.
3 Model
We consider the New Keynesian Phillips curve, presented in Clarida et al. (1999),
πt = δEt[πt+1] + λyt + ξt. (1)
We use πt and yt to denote (log) inﬂation and (log) output in period t. Et is the
expectations operator. Parameter λ satisﬁes λ > 0, and δ is the common discount
factor (0 < δ < 1). The cost-push shock ξt is given by an AR(1) process
ξt = ρξt−1 + εt, (2)
3Important further contributions to the theory of incentive contracts have been made by Beetsma
and Jensen (1998, 1999), Jensen (1997), Lockwood (1997), and Svensson (1997b).
4where 0 < ρ < 1. The εt’s are i.i.d. and drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and variance v2. We refrain from complementing the model with an IS curve
because the IS curve is irrelevant for our purposes.4






where a > 0. In each period t, the central banker publishes an inﬂation forecast π
f
t+1
for period t + 1.
For simplicity, we assume that monetary policy is conducted by an individual central
banker.5 The central banker aims at minimizing social losses lt. In addition, he may be
held responsible for the accuracy of his own inﬂation forecasts. This can be achieved by






on the central banker
if his forecasts fail to come about. Parameter b (b ≥ 0) is chosen by the contract.
Eﬀectively, a particular value of b is associated with a particular salary decrease when
forecasts are not accurate. To make sure that the central banker participates, the
contract may also specify a ﬁxed payment above his normal wage, resulting in an
additional additive, policy-independent term in his loss function. As such a constant
term in the loss function does not aﬀect the central banker’s choice of monetary policy
and forecasts, it will be neglected for the remainder of the paper.
As a consequence, total central banker losses in period t are
l
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For b = 0, our model collapses to the case where the central banker minimizes social
losses. Our main institutional design issue is which value of b will minimize social losses
and thus which type of inﬂation forecast contract is optimal.
4For example, the IS curve could be speciﬁed as yt = −σ(it − Etπt+1 − rt) + Etyt+1 + µt, with
σ > 0, the nominal interest rate it, the natural real rate of interest rt, and a demand shock µt. The
central banker could always stabilize µt by an appropriate adjustment of the interest rate. Therefore,
without loss of generality, yt can be viewed as the central banker’s instrument.
5Our analysis can be easily extended to the case where a committee rather than an individual
central banker decides on monetary policy. Then, at each meeting, committee members would vote
not only on the interest rate but also on an inﬂation forecast. All members would be paid according
to the precision of the committee’s forecasts. Our results would continue to hold in such a framework.
5With the help of the algorithm described in S¨ oderlind (1999), we compute the discre-
tionary solution for diﬀerent values of b. In each period t, the central banker minimizes
his losses by choosing current policy and the inﬂation forecast for the next period. In
this, he takes the process by which the public forms its inﬂation expectations as given.
This process, in turn, has to be consistent with the policy actually pursued by the
central banker. In each period t, there are two predetermined variables (ξt and π
f
t ) and
one non-predetermined one (πt). The central banker’s instruments in period t are yt
and π
f
t+1. Appendix A gives more details on the application of S¨ oderlind’s algorithm
to our framework.
3.1 Plausible parameter values
Unless stated otherwise, we choose the parameter values used in Clarida et al. (2000) for
quarterly data, i.e. δ = 0.99, ρ = 0.9, and λ = 0.3. To select an appropriate value for
a, we note that the social loss function can be derived from microeconomic foundations
(see Woodford (2002)). In this case, a = λ/θ would hold, where θ is the elasticity of
substitution in the Dixit-Stiglitz index of aggregate demand (see Woodford (2002), p.
22). A plausible value for θ is 11, which implies a mark-up of 10% over marginal costs.
Consequently, a = 0.3/11 ≈ 0.03. No assumption is needed about the size of v2, which
is the variance of the shock εt, because this parameter is immaterial to our results.
To demonstrate the generality of our ﬁndings, we compute some of our simulations for
a broad range of plausible parameter values containing the abovementioned parameter
constellation as a special case. In these simulations, we use a range of δ = 0.970...0.995.
Various studies ﬁnd values from 0.05 (Taylor (1980)) to 1.22 (Chari et al. (2000)) for λ.
For ρ, values between 0.0 and 0.9 are encountered in the literature (see Clarida et al.
(1999)). We extend this range slightly to 0.00...0.95. Moreover, a, the weight of the
output objective in relation to the inﬂation objective in the social loss function, can be
plausibly assumed to be lower than 1.6 For b, which is chosen by the contract designer,
we consider values up to 20.0. We summarize the set of plausible parameter values in
Table 1.
6See Cecchetti and Krause (2002) for a summary of the literature on estimates of a.
6Parameter Range
δ 0.970 ... 0.995
λ 0.05 ... 1.22
ρ 0.00 ... 0.95
a 0.001 ... 1.000
b 0.000001 ... 20.0
Table 1: Set of plausible parameter values
3.2 The impact of projections on expectations
As a preliminary step, we study the impact of inﬂation projections on the public’s
inﬂation expectations. For this purpose, we note that S¨ oderlind’s algorithm yields a
(1×2) matrix C that describes how the non-predetermined variable πt depends on the
state variables ξt and π
f








With the help of Etξt+1 = ρξt, this equation can be used to describe expectations about
inﬂation
Etπt+1 = C11ρξt + C12π
f
t+1. (6)
Hence the entries in C describe how inﬂation expectations depend on the cost-push
shock and the central banker’s inﬂation forecast.
With the S¨ oderlind algorithm, it is straightforward to verify that C12 converges to zero
as b goes to zero. Thus inﬂation forecasts have no impact on inﬂation expectations and
other economic variables in the absence of an inﬂation forecast contract (b = 0).
For positive values of b, we obtain
Numerical Finding 1
For all parameter constellations in Table 1, C12 > 0 holds. For positive values of ρ,
C11 > 0 also holds.
The ﬁnding C12 > 0 implies that, in line with Gersbach and Hahn (2011), an increase
in the inﬂation forecast leads to higher inﬂation expectations. This is plausible because
7the public knows that the central banker will ﬁnd it costly to deviate from his fore-
cast. Moreover, higher realizations of ξt lead to higher inﬂation expectations for given
inﬂation forecasts (C11 > 0) under the assumption of autoregressive cost-push shocks
(ρ > 0).
To summarize, inﬂation forecast contracts enable the central banker to inﬂuence inﬂa-
tion expectations. Manipulating inﬂation expectations is potentially desirable because,
in line with the New Keynesian Phillips curve, they impact on current inﬂation.
4 The Consequences of Inﬂation Forecast Contracts
4.1 The impact on inﬂation, output, and welfare
Next we turn to the implications that inﬂation forecast contracts have for welfare. In a
ﬁrst step, we explore how rewarding the central banker for the precision of his inﬂation
forecasts aﬀects inﬂation variance.
Numerical Finding 2
For all parameter constellations in Table 1, the unconditional variance of inﬂation is
reduced by inﬂation forecast contracts.
The intuition for this ﬁnding is straightforward. Inﬂation forecast contracts enable the
central banker to eﬀectively anchor expectations about future inﬂation by choosing an
appropriate inﬂation forecast, which stabilizes current inﬂation. As a result, inﬂation
forecast contracts reduce inﬂation variance.
Next we examine how the introduction of inﬂation forecast aﬀects output variance.
Numerical Finding 3
For all parameter constellations in Table 1, inﬂation forecast contracts reduce the
unconditional variance of output.
8Intuitively, the central banker cannot incorporate information about εt into his inﬂation
forecast in period t − 1. As he will later ﬁnd it costly to deviate from this inﬂation
forecast, he will not allow the shock εt to have a strong impact on inﬂation. As a
consequence, he will tolerate larger ﬂuctuations in output in response to εt.
To summarize, inﬂation forecast contracts have ambiguous eﬀects on welfare. They
lower inﬂation variance but increase output variance. A priori, it is unclear which
eﬀect will dominate with regard to welfare. For small values of b, i.e. a low weight on
forecast deviations in the central banker’s loss function, we can establish a clear-cut
result:
Numerical Finding 4
For all parameter constellations in Table 1, inﬂation forecast contracts lower social
losses if b is suﬃciently small but positive.
This ﬁnding has the important corollary that inﬂation forecast contracts always lead
to welfare gains if the contract designer makes an optimal choice of b.
4.2 Optimal level of b
Having demonstrated that inﬂation forecast contracts can always be used to enhance
welfare, we now focus on the optimal design of these contracts and on the size of the
resulting welfare gains. Accordingly, we examine the optimal weight on deviations from
the inﬂation forecast target in the central banker’s loss function, b.7
For the benchmark parameter values, Figure 1 shows the welfare gains created by in-
ﬂation forecast contracts over the benchmark case without incentive contracts. They
are expressed as a fraction of the welfare gains that can be achieved by perfect com-
mitment.8 The ﬁgure shows b on the horizontal axis. Two facts are remarkable. First,
for an appropriate value of b, large welfare gains are possible. Approximately 86% of
7The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target has been considered by
Rogoﬀ (1985). We perform a similar exercise for commitment to a forecast target.
8See Clarida et al. (1999), pp. 1681-3, for a speciﬁcation of the solution under commitment.

























Figure 1: Welfare gains created by inﬂation forecast contracts as a fraction of the
welfare gains that could be reached by perfect commitment. Parameter b is shown on
the horizontal axis. Other parameters: δ = 0.99, ρ = 0.9, λ = 0.3, σ = 1, and a = 0.3
the welfare gains achievable by optimal commitment can be attained by simple one-
period-ahead, non-contingent inﬂation forecasts.9 Second, the optimal value of b is
rather high, with a maximum of welfare gains at b ≈ 7.3. A high value of b is so-
cially beneﬁcial because it enables the central banker to aﬀect inﬂation expectations
eﬀectively through inﬂation forecasts, which in turn makes for eﬀective stabilization of
current inﬂation.
These ﬁndings demonstrate the desirability of incentive contracts, according to which
central bankers’ wages depend on the accuracy of inﬂation forecasts. We emphasize
that the desirability of inﬂation forecast contracts is not restricted to the parameter
constellation considered in Figure 1. In line with Numerical Finding 4, rewarding
central bankers for accuracy in their inﬂation forecasts improves welfare for the whole
range of parameters speciﬁed in Table 1, provided that parameter b is chosen optimally
by the contract designer.
9More precisely, we compare unconditional losses in the inﬂation forecast scenario with those for
optimal commitment from a timeless perspective (see Woodford (1999)).
104.3 Comparison to inﬂation contracts
Welfare comparison
In this section, we compare inﬂation forecast contracts with standard inﬂation con-
tracts, i.e. incentive contracts rewarding central bankers not for the precision of their
forecasts but granting bonus payments to central bankers for achieving the socially
optimal level of inﬂation. More speciﬁcally, we assume that inﬂation contracts inﬂict
additional costs b0π2
t on the central banker, where b0 ≥ 0 is a parameter that can be
chosen by the contract designer.10
As a result, the central banker’s per-period loss function is
l
CB0
t = lt + b
0π
2






Eﬀectively, inﬂation contracts make central bankers more conservative by increasing
the relative weight on deviations from the inﬂation target.
It is well-known that in the New Keynesian model the delegation of monetary policy
to a conservative central banker yields welfare gains, even when central bankers are
not pursuing an output target that exceeds the natural level of output (see Clarida
et al. (1999)) so that the classic problem of an inﬂation bias is immaterial (Kydland
and Prescott (1977)). This indicates the potential desirability of inﬂation contracts.
Figure 2 shows that rewarding central bankers for the precision of their forecasts gener-
ally leads to somewhat higher welfare, over and against the case where central bankers
receive additional rewards for achieving the socially optimal level of inﬂation. In par-
ticular, the optimal level of b in the former case guarantees higher welfare than the
respective optimal level of b0 in the latter. The superior performance of wages con-
tingent on forecasting accuracy is even more pronounced for lower values of ρ, as can
be seen from Figure 3, which displays the welfare gains that can be achieved by both
types of incentive contract for ρ = 0.5. This observation adumbrates a more general
ﬁnding, to be discussed in the next Section 4.4. There we demonstrate that additional
10As in inﬂation forecast contracts, ﬁxed wage increases can be speciﬁed in inﬂation contracts to
satisfy the central banker’s participation constraint.

























Figure 2: Welfare gains created by incentive contracts imposing additional costs on
central bankers if (i) inﬂation diﬀers from its socially optimal level (solid line) and (ii)
inﬂation forecasts are not accurate (broken line). Parameter b (b0) is shown on the
horizontal axis. Other parameters: δ = 0.99, ρ = 0.9, λ = 0.3, and a = 0.03






















Figure 3: Welfare gains created by incentive contracts imposing additional costs on
central bankers if (i) inﬂation diﬀers from its socially optimal level (solid line) and (ii)
inﬂation forecasts are not accurate (broken line). Parameter b (b0) is shown on the
horizontal axis. Other parameters: δ = 0.99, ρ = 0.5, λ = 0.3, and a = 0.03
12incentives for making accurate forecasts can improve monetary policy even for very
low values of ρ, while in this case inﬂation contracts cannot improve monetary policy
making.11
Ease of contracting
Compared to inﬂation contracts, which specify additional rewards for central bankers
when inﬂation is close to the socially optimal rate, inﬂation forecast contracts can
also be used if the socially optimal inﬂation rate is subject to shocks that cannot
be contracted upon. This is an obvious consequence of the fact that only previous
inﬂation forecasts and actual inﬂation rates are required to determine the wages of
central bankers. Moreover, inﬂation forecast contracts can also be used if the central
banker enjoys goal independence and can specify the inﬂation target himself. Inﬂation
contracts cannot be applied in these cases.
4.4 Role of autocorrelated shocks
One conceivable question is whether our results depend on the fact that the ξt’s are
autocorrelated. But welfare gains from inﬂation forecast contracts can also be achieved
if the ξt’s are independent and identically distributed, i.e. ρ = 0, as explained in this
section.
Suppose ρ = 0 and a positive shock has occurred (ξt > 0). Then it might seem plausible
for the central banker to forecast π
f
t+1 = 0 because Et[ξt+1] = 0. However, this is not
the case, as such a choice would concentrate the entire losses stemming from ξt in
period t. Because per-period losses are convex, it is more eﬃcient to distribute the
impact of ξt on inﬂation and output over several periods. This can be achieved by
setting the inﬂation forecast below the target (π
f
t+1 < 0), thereby reducing Et[πt+1],
11Inﬂation forecast contracts may be inferior to inﬂation contracts for very low values of λ, as can be
shown by considering λ = 0.05. In this case, the detrimental eﬀect on output variance of the inﬂation
forecast contracts becomes especially severe. Intuitively, a very low value of λ means that the central
banker has to engineer large swings in output in order to stabilize the impact of the present shock εt
on inﬂation.







































Figure 4: Squared inﬂation forecast error as a function of b. Other parameters: δ =
0.99, ρ = 0.9, λ = 0.3, and a = 0.03
which in turn lowers πt in period t. This procedure reduces social losses in period t at
the expense of the social losses in period t + 1.12
We conclude that a central banker with an inﬂation forecast contract can reduce ex-
pectations about future inﬂation below the long-term target and thus stabilize current
inﬂation after a positive cost-push shock. By contrast, a central banker with an inﬂation
contract cannot lower inﬂation expectations below the long-term target for inﬂation.
The public knows that he will always implement an inﬂation rate that on average is
identical to the inﬂation target. Hence inﬂation contracts cannot enhance welfare for
ρ = 0 in the absence of an inﬂation bias.
4.5 Impact on the accuracy of forecasts
In this section we examine the impact of the size of the costs incurred by deviations,
b, on the precision of the forecasts. As can be seen from Figure 4, the higher b is, the
lower is the unconditional variance of the inﬂation forecast error πt − π
f
t .
12In the standard model, the commitment solution implies a mean-reverting price level (see Clarida
et al. (1999)). In our model, the central banker mimics this solution to some extent by announcing
inﬂation rates that are below target for positive cost-push shocks.
14Thus we arrive at the plausible ﬁnding that rewarding the central banker for the preci-
sion of his forecasts will raise the accuracy of these forecast. Two eﬀects are responsible
for this. First, if rewards for precise forecasts are high, the central banker will obviously
be more interested in aligning inﬂation with the forecast. The second eﬀect is more
subtle. As we have shown, inﬂation forecast contracts lower the variance of inﬂation
and thus make inﬂation more predictable. As a result, the accuracy of the central
banker’s inﬂation forecasts will increase. Because inﬂation forecast contracts improve
the precision of inﬂation forecasts, they may contribute to transparency in monetary
policy.
Interestingly, the improvement in forecasting accuracy occurs although the precision of
the central banker’s information is unaﬀected by the introduction of incentive contracts.
If information acquisition were endogenous, incentive contracts would lead to additional
improvements in the quality of forecasts by inducing the central banker to look for more
precise information.
5 Conclusions
We have shown that rewarding central bankers for the precision of their inﬂation fore-
casts makes the inﬂation forecast an eﬀective tool for inﬂuencing inﬂation expectations.
As a consequence, inﬂation forecast contracts enable a more eﬀective stabilization of
inﬂation and reduce the error inherent in inﬂation forecasts. However, they also cause
higher output variance.
With regard to welfare, the incentive contracts considered in this paper create a trade-
oﬀ. They enable the central banker to inﬂuence the public’s expectations, which is so-
cially desirable. However, they also reduce the central banker’s ﬂexibility in responding
to unexpected shocks. On balance, the beneﬁcial eﬀect of incentive contracts domi-
nates for large sets of plausible parameters, and it is optimal to create large incentives
for central bankers to adhere to their inﬂation forecasts.
Our model may also shed light on the apparent success of central banks that have
adopted inﬂation targeting. One essential ingredient in the inﬂation targeting strategy
15is the publication of inﬂation forecasts. It is not implausible that even in the absence
of incentive contracts minor costs may accrue for central bankers when their forecasts
fail to materialize. Then the release of inﬂation forecasts is socially desirable.
There are several useful extensions to our model. First, we might consider a central
banker attempting to push output above its natural level. If monetary policy faced the
problem of an inﬂation bias, the logic of our analysis suggests that incentive contracts
contingent on the central banker’s forecasting performance will involve additional ad-
vantages.
Second, it is worth noting that the incentive contracts considered in this paper have
no adverse eﬀect on the stabilization of demand shocks. This can easily be veriﬁed
by introducing demand shocks into our model and noting that they can always be
stabilized perfectly, irrespective of whether incentive contracts are used.13
Third, more complex incentive contracts may further improve the performance of cen-
tral banks. However, these contracts would condition the remuneration of central
bankers on current shocks and the output gap, which are diﬃcult to measure.14 More-
over, such contracts may not be feasible if the size and nature of economic shocks
cannot be veriﬁed in court. By contrast, the incentive contracts considered in this pa-
per are both simple and based on easily observable variables. Central banks routinely
publish inﬂation forecasts, and prices can be measured with a comparably high degree
of precision. Another important conclusion is that even the simple incentive contracts
proposed in this paper would deliver a large proportion of the welfare gains that could
be achieved by optimal commitment.
13See footnote 4.
14Beetsma and Jensen (1999) argue that state-contingent delegation is plausible to be more vulner-
able to McCallum’s critique that delegation may not be time-consistent (see McCallum (1995)).
16A Computation of Discretionary Solution
Using S¨ oderlind’s notation, let xt := (ξt,π
f
t ,πt)0. The predetermined entries of xt are
x1t := (ξt,π
f
t )0, and the non-predetermined entry is x2t := πt. The vector of policy
instruments is ut := (yt,π
f
t+1)0.






























































When choosing ut, the central banker has to take into account how expectations about
the non-predetermined period-(t + 1) variable are formed. The non-predetermined
variable x2t+1 = πt+1 in period t + 1 will be a linear function of the predetermined
variables in this period. Thus we can write πt+1 = x2t+1 = Ct+1x1t+1, where Ct+1
is a (1 × 2) matrix. Consequently, the expectations are given by Etπt+1 = Etx2t+1 =
Ct+1Etx1t+1. The central banker’s optimization problem leads to the Bellman equation:
x
0















s.t. Ex2t+1 = Ct+1Etx1t+1, Eq. (8) and x1t given.
(12)
This optimization problem can be solved recursively by the procedure introduced in
Backus and Driﬃll (1986) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985) and implemented in matlab by
S¨ oderlind (1999). We apply these matlab routines.
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